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The Unintended Consequences of Household 
Phosphate Bans*
by Alex Cohen and David Keiser
alex.w.cohen@yale.edu; dkeiser@iastate.edu
IN 2010, seventeen US states implemented mandatory bans on the 
sale of phosphates in automatic 
dishwasher detergent, due to concern 
over the adverse effects that arise from 
excess phosphorus loads to our lakes, 
rivers, and streams.1  Excess phosphorus 
can lead to harmful algal blooms, 
excessive aquatic plant growth, and 
alterations to the composition of aquatic 
species, among other changes. 
Accordingly, the US EPA considers 
nutrient pollution to be one of the most 
important environmental challenges we 
face in the twenty-ϐirst century (USEPA 
2009). Effectively and efϐiciently 
addressing this challenge requires a 
sound understanding of phosphorus 
control policies. We ϐind that the 
effectiveness of these bans to reduce 
phosphorus pollution is highly 
dependent upon regulations that are in 
place at wastewater treatment facilities 
and that pre-existing regulations at 
certain wastewater treatment facilities 
render these bans ineffective precisely 
in the areas in which phosphorus 
pollution is most problematic.
 When a household runs its 
dishwasher, that waste travels through 
a sewer system to a wastewater 
treatment facility (as inϐluent) where 
it is treated before being discharged 
into the environment (as efϐluent) (see 
Figure 1). The Clean Water Act requires 
Figure 1. Wastewater Treatment
*Note: This article is based on a working paper by Alex Cohen and David Keiser, “The Effectiveness of Overlapping Pollution Regulation: 
Evidence from the Ban on Phosphates in Automatic Dishwasher Detergent” https://sites.google.com/site/dkeiserecon/home/papers. Cohen 
is a Postdoctoral Associate in the School of Management at Yale University (alex.w.cohen@yale.edu). Keiser is an Assistant Professor in the 
Department of Economics and an afϐiliated faculty member in the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development at Iowa State University 
(dkeiser@iastate.edu). We thank Becky Olson for providing graphics for Figure 1. 
that wastewater treatment facilities 
meet a basic level of treatment known 
as secondary treatment. However, 
where water quality fails to support 
state-designated uses of waterways, 
additional stringent efϐluent standards 
(limits) may be placed on particular 
pollutants such as phosphorus. With 
a fairly simple theoretical model of 
wastewater treatment behavior, it is 
easy to show that these “limit facilities” 
have little incentive to deviate from 
their current phosphorus efϐluent 
levels. The basic intuition is as follows: 
Removing phosphorus from wastewater 
treatment efϐluent is expensive. 
Wastewater treatment facilities ϐind it 
in their own best interest to minimize 
costs of treating phosphorus subject 
to meeting regulated limits. Although 
the phosphorus ban lowers the amount 
of phosphorus entering a wastewater 
treatment facility, that facility faces 
no incentive to pass through these 
reductions. Instead, the bans provide 
a cost savings to the facility by 
lowering the amount of phosphorus 
inϐluent it must treat to meet its limit. 
Consequently, in areas served by limit 
facilities, we expect that these bans will 
have little-to-no effect on phosphorus 
entering the rivers, streams, and lakes in 
which these facilities discharge. 
Using detailed data on efϐluent at 
wastewater treatment facilities in states 
with mandatory phosphate bans, this 
is exactly what we ϐind. We examine 
the difference in phosphorus efϐluent 
before and after the 2010 bans took 
place at limit versus no-limit facilities. 
We ϐind that phosphorus efϐluent 
dropped 18 percentage points more 
at facilities without limits compared 
to facilities with limits after the bans 
were implemented—consistent with 
engineering estimates attributing 
1These states are Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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from 9 to 34 percent of phosphorus 
inϐluent to automatic dishwasher 
detergent. We show that phosphorus 
efϐluent at limit and no-limit facilities 
had very similar trends prior to the 
bans taking hold in 2010. This gives 
us conϐidence in attributing the 
differential drop in phosphorus at limit 
facilities as arising from these facilities 
reacting differently to the ban. 
To provide further evidence of this 
predicted behavior, we use a unique 
dataset from the state of Minnesota 
that records both phosphorus inϐluent 
as well as phosphorus efϐluent. We use 
these data for three main purposes. 
First, by observing phosphorus inϐluent 
at wastewater treatment facilities, 
we show that the differential drop in 
phosphorus efϐluent at limit versus no-
limit facilities over the ban period is not 
due to a differential drop in phosphorus 
inϐluent over that time period. In other 
words, these data provide further 
evidence that the differential change in 
efϐluent is due to differences in behavior 
at limit and no-limit facilities, not a 
differential change in the amount of 
phosphorus entering these facilities. 
Second, we use the Minnesota data 
to estimate what we term the elasticity 
of phosphorus efϐluent with respect to 
inϐluent. This elasticity is the percentage 
change in phosphorus efϐluent with 
respect to a percentage change in 
phosphorus inϐluent. These estimates 
tell us how responsive these types of 
facilities are to any inϐluent policy, not 
just bans. Our estimates place a lower 
bound of 0.5 on this elasticity at no-limit 
facilities. For limit facilities, the magnitude 
is approximately 0.1 and insigniϐicant, 
suggesting that, as expected, efϐluent 
from limit facilities responds very little to 
changes in inϐluent.   
Finally, we use the Minnesota data 
to quantify how effective these bans 
are at reducing phosphorus efϐluent. 
Using our econometric estimates and 
theoretical predictions, we bound 
elasticity at no-limit facilities between 
0.5 and 1.0 and elasticity at limit 
facilities between 0 and 0.1. Using 
the share of inϐluent at limit and no-
limit wastewater treatment facilities 
in Minnesota, we ϐind that for every 
one percent decrease in phosphorus 
inϐluent, phosphorus efϐluent across all 
facilities falls by 0.41 to 0.76 percent. 
However, when we examine waterways 
that were impaired by nutrients in 
2014, for every one percent decrease 
in phosphorus inϐluent, phosphorus 
efϐluent falls by only 0.18 to 0.21 
percent. If Minnesota is representative 
of other ban states, these results imply 
that phosphate bans in aggregate yield 
41 to 76 percent of the expected efϐluent 
reductions. More striking is the fact 
that these bans yield only 20 percent of 
the expected efϐluent reductions in the 
most polluted waterways. This occurs 
because limits to control phosphorus 
efϐluent have already been implemented 
in many impaired waterways.
Finding efϐicient and effective 
solutions to phosphorus pollution 
is not easy—the US has struggled 
with cultural eutrophication for 
several decades. At ϐirst blush, 
banning phosphates in automatic 
dishwasher detergent may appear to 
be a clear solution to this problem. 
Common intuition is that banning a 
pollutant leads to an improvement in 
environmental quality. This was the 
case when phosphates in household 
laundry detergent were banned in 
the 1970s. However, since that time, 
phosphorus limits have been introduced 
at many wastewater treatment facilities. 
The effectiveness of phosphate bans is 
now tempered by regulations in place 
at wastewater treatment facilities. If the 
goal of the bans is as stated—to reduce 
phosphate entering US waters—we 
argue that these bans are misplaced. 
Economists have argued for several 
decades that market-based approaches 
to pollution management have many 
advantages over command-and-
control policies. Indeed, in our setting, 
our theory suggests that a tax on 
phosphorous efϐluent would incentivize 
wastewater treatment facilities to pass 
through inϐluent reductions, avoiding 
the unintended consequences that we 
ϐind. Yet, water quality policy in the US 
remains largely reliant on command-
and-control policies such as efϐluent 
standards, technology standards, and 
bans. Part of this reason is that these 
policies are often thought to provide 
a guaranteed means to improve the 
environment. However, when there 
are overlapping policies, even this 
advantage of command-and-control 
policies is muted. Even if the adoption 
of market-based approaches remains 
limited, at the very least, policymakers 
ought to take into account how pre-
existing regulations might mitigate the 
effect of potential policies. 
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